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Introduction 
The 1 948 Costa Rican civil war stands as the most significant breakdown 
of emerging democratic practices in what many believe is a country with 
a democratic destiny.1 No other political conflict has so polarised the 
country and cost so many lives. Nor has any other civil war so influenced 
the way analysts view and understand the development of democratic 
institutions in Costa Rica. Why political actors in Costa Rica settled their 
disputes on the battlefield, however, is a question that has yet to generate 
a satisfactory response. 
The immediate precedent of the civil war was the annulment of the 
presidential election by the Constitutional Congress on I March 1 94 8 .  The 
election, allegedly won by the opposition candidate Otilio Ulate Blanco 
and his Party of National Unification (PUN), occurred in an environment 
of intense party competition, not infrequently characterised by the use of 
violence and fraud. These results were questioned by members of the 
governing political party (the National Republican Party [PRN]) loyal to 
the government's favourite and former president of the Republic between 
1 940 and 1 944, Dr Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia. 
* The initial (and major) drafts of this article were written while I was a Visiting 
Professor, School of History and Research Associate, Centre for Historical 
Investigations, University of Costa Rica. I wish to acknowledge the support of the 
Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies for an 
International Doctoral Research Fellowship that funded the research upon which this 
paper is  based. 
1 For an evaluation of alternative explanations of the democratisation of Costa Rican 
politics, see my ' Explicando los origenes de los regimenes democraticos: Costa Rica en 
perspectiva te6rica', Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos (San Jose,  Costa Rica), Vol. 
1 6 , Fasc . I ( 1 990). 
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In the weeks that followed, attempts to negotiate a pact between the 
opposition and government proved fruitless. Attempts to effect such 
political compromises became pointless once the forces led by Jose 
Figueres Ferrer made clear to other political actors their intention to 
organise a junta to rule Costa Rica for what eventually became a period 
of eighteen months.2 During its brief rule, the junta convened a National 
Constituent Assembly that refashioned Costa Rican political institutions 
by, among other things, creating a politically autonomous electoral court 
system and enfranchising all Costa Ricans over the age of 20.3 
Images of these events diverge among Costa Ricans.4 Many see 1 948 as 
the culmination of the Calderonistas' attempts to install a corrupt 
dictatorship in Costa Rica.5 The PRN is also lambasted for commencing 
an alliance with the Popular Vanguard Party, PVP (the Costa Rican 
communist party), during Calderon Guardia's presidency, an alliance 
solidified by his successor, Teodoro Picado. In these accounts, Figueres is 
portrayed as the saviour of Costa Rica's democratic heritage. Indeed, the 
most recent attempts to discuss Costa Rican democracy credit Figueres 
with not only vanquishing the 'Caldero-comunista' regime, but with 
making the key decisions leading to the consolidation of the politically 
stable democratic regime present in Costa Rica since 1 949 .6 It was in this 
year, after all, that the Figueres junta relinquished power to President-
2 This period remains unstudied, except for John W. Gardner, ' The Costa Rican J unta 
of 1 948-49 ',  unpub! .  PhD dissertation, St John's University, 1 97 I. 
3 Studies of the National Constituent Assembly are: Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli ,  La 
constitucion de [949 : antecedentes y proyecciones (San Jose,  1 97 3) and Mario Alberto 
J imenez, Historia constitucional de Costa Rica (San J ose, 1 979), pp. 154-69' A detailed 
account of each of the Assembly's  sessions can be found in Ruben Hernandez Poveda, 
Desde la barra: como se discutioy emitio la Constitucion Polltica de [949 (San Jose,  1 95 3) .  
Hernandez Poveda covered Assembly debates as a reporter for the daily evening paper, 
La prensa libre (San Jose,  Costa Rica) . 
4 For an overview of the political debate about the meaning of the 1 940s, sec Mariana 
Campos Vargas, ' La coyuntura, 1 940- 1 948: el ascenso de nuevas fuerzas sociales y los 
cambios en las funciones del estado' in Jaime Murillo Viquez (ed.), Historia de Costa Rica 
en el siglo XX (San J ose, 1 9 8 9)' Also, see her' La coyuntura 1 940-48 ,  entre el testimonio 
y la academia: un analisis historiografico', unpub!' Master' s  Thesis, MA Programme in 
Central American History, University of Costa Rica, 1 9 8 9 .  
5 The most succinct anti-Calderonista account of the 1 940S is  Alberto F .  Canas, Los ochos 
aiios (San Jose, 1 9 8 2; originally published in 1 955) . Also, see J ose Figueres Ferrer, 
Palabras Gastadas (San Jose, 1 9 79; originally published in Mexico in 1 942) and his 
recently published EI espiritu del 48 (San J ose, 1 9 8 7) .  
8 The ideological dominance of  Figuerista images of  1 948 is particularly acute among 
North American scholars .  This is discussed in Lowell Gudmundson's useful review 
essay, ' Costa Rica and the 1 948 Revolution: Rethinking the Social Democratic 
Paradigm ' ,  Latin American Research Revie1lJ, vo! . 1 9, no. 1 ( 1 984). A recent attempt to 
interpret the events of the 1 940S in thi s way is J ohn A. Booth, ' Costa Rica: The Roots 
of Democratic Stability ' ,  in Larry Diamond and J uan Linz (eds.), Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, 1 9 8 9) .  
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elect Ulate Blanco, the first individual to exercise the powers of the 
presidency under the new constitution. 
Few other voices echo as loudly as those of the Figueristas. Though 
several prominent individuals of the old regime have left memoirs or 
written about diverse aspects of these years, their accounts either have not 
been made readily available or not received the attention they merit as 
alternative interpretations of the events surrounding the 1 948 civil war.7 
Common to the most prevalent images of the 1 948 civil war is the belief 
that the conflict between a social reformist (but, many would add, a 
corrupt) government and an allegedly conservative opposition closely 
aligned with Costa Rica's coffee oligarchy could be settled only through 
the force of arms. Jorge Mario Salazar Mora neatly summarises this widely 
accepted belief when he writes that: 
the 1 948 election could not resolve peacefully the dispute between the two 
political groupings of that epoch, because the degree of social tension between 
class fractions and classes exceeded the limits of peaceful coexistence. 
Consequently a trial of strength was required to restructure the state apparatus 
and re-accommodate social forces. 8 
In this essay I will probe the veracity of this belief. 
For many, raising this issue is pointless because it leads to counterfactual 
reasoning of dubious utility. Yet I suggest that not pursuing this line of 
inquiry implies the more troublesome assumption that the civil war was 
inevitable. To the extent that the volition of individuals is discussed, the 
proponents of the strong inevitabilist thesis see individuals and other 
political agents as actors caught in a play that, by definition, possesses pre­
established roles. Though perhaps none of the chroniclers of the 1 940S 
quite so openly adopts the strong inevitabilist thesis favoured by Salazar 
Mora, they all share a number of its essential corollaries, as I shall show 
in this article. 
What is pernicious about the inevitabilist thesis, I argue, is that it leads 
to the under-reporting of evidence and/or the refusal to explore issues 
7 The most comprehensive account of the 1 940S by a Calderonista is Jose Albertazzi 
Avendano, La tragedia de Costa Rica (Mexico, D. F ., 1 9 5  I ). The limited diffusion of anti­
Figllerista accounts is nicely illustrated by the fact that Albertazzi Avendano's memoirs 
cannot be found in the holdings of the National Library, even though he served as its 
director during the 1 9 3 0s .  Other useful sources include Teodoro Picado, EI pacta de la 
embqjada de Mexico (Managua, 1 948) and the writings of Manuel Mora Valverde, many 
of which have been published in his Discursos, 19}4-1919 (San Jose,  1 9 80) .  
8 See his' El sistema politico-electoral costarricense del periodo 1 9 1 4- 1 948 ' ,  in Historia 
de Costa Rica en el siglo XX, p. 5 J. Also, see Claudio A. Vargas A . ,  ' La guerra civil de 
1 948: la sustitucion del modelo liberal ' ,  in Carmen Lila Gomez et al. (eds .), Las 
institllciones Costarricenses del Siglo XX (San Jose,  1 9 8 8) .  I have sought to translate all 
passages contained in the text of this article into English from Spanish in the most 
literal fashion that the proper use of English permits .  
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that do not fit with whatever version of this thesis the analyst is either 
covertly or overtly propounding. Assuming that the 1 948 civil war was 
inevitable helps to obscure the role played by different political actors; 
sustains distorted images of the nature and significance of the 1 948 civil 
war; and cripples the study of the origins of democratic institutions in 
Costa Rica. That both those who focus on the behaviour of politicians and 
those who seek to uncover the ' real ' economic roots of the 1 948 civil war 
are inevitabilists suggests that the study of this conflict may benefit from 
critical reflection. 
The principal objective of this essay is to suggest that compelling 
reasons exist for re-interpreting the origins and significance of the 1 948 
civil war. It begins by discussing the most important, largely political 
accounts of the 1 948 civil war. It then examines the arguments made by 
what are here labelled class and economic interpretations of the 1 940S .  It 
then argues that extant ways of understanding the origins of the 1 948 civil 
war are undermined by the existence of questionable empirical claims and 
dubious theoretical conclusions. The conclusion sketches an alternative 
way of conceptualising political conflict that unravels the puzzles left 
unresolved by the principal analysts of the 1 948 civil war. 
Political perspectives 
The two most important political chronicles of the events leading to the 
1 948 civil war are the books by Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli and John Patrick 
Bel1. 9  Although Miguel Acuna, Eugenio Rodriguez Vega and Jacobo 
Schifter (in one of his books not examined in this article) have written on 
the politics of this period, I do not classify their volumes along with those 
of Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell, because the former three authors pursue 
different objectives.10 Acuna is more interested in questioning certain 
beliefs about the events of 1 948, largely through the use of interviews with 
key individuals and a reading of select documents. Rodriguez Vega's book 
is essentially a well-written set of personal recollections about the 1 940s, 
9 Aguilar Bulgarelli ' s  book is entitled Costa Rica y sus hechos politicos de 1948 : problematica 
de una dicada (San Jose, 1 969). Bell 's  volume is called Crisis in Costa Rica : the 1948 
Revolution (Austin, 1 971 ). This book was translated and published in Costa Rica by 
EDUCA in 1 976. All page citations refer to the English-language version of Bell ' s  
book. 
10 See Miguel Acuna, EI 48 (San J ose, 1 975 ) ; Eugenio Rodriguez Vega, De Calderon a 
Figueres (San Jose,  1 9 8  I); and J acobo Schifter Sikora, Las alianzas conflictivas : las 
relaciones de Estados Unidos y Costa Rica desde la segunda guerra mundial a la guerra fria (San 
Jose, 1 9 8 6). Schifter's book was originally presented as a doctoral dissertation in the 
department of history, Columbia University, in 1 9 8 3  under the title of' The Origins of 
the Cold War in Central America: A Study of Diplomatic Relations Between Costa 
Rica and the United States ( 1 940-48 ) ' .  A preliminary version of this book was 
published as Costa Rica, 1948 : andlisis de los dommentos conftdenciales del departamento de 
estado (San Jose, 1 9 8 2 ). 
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buttressed by some minor primary source research. Schifter delineates the 
course taken by US-Costa Rican relations during the 1 940S and thereby 
furnishes a wealth of previously little-known information on the events of 
1 948. Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell's efforts merit special consideration 
because they are the only attempts to examine comprehensively the 
politics of the 1 948 civil war. 
In broad outline, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell offer similar accounts of 
the relations between the government and opposition during the 1 940s. 
The differences between their books are minor and stem from the fact that 
Bell, as a Tulane University graduate student conducting research for his 
PhD dissertation, provides a more analytical account of the 1 940S than 
Aguilar Bulgarelli. The narratives of these two authors attempt to 
uncover the multiplicity of factors that influenced the behaviour of key 
political figures and political parties during this decade. Through a 
description of such events and processes, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell seek 
to explain why the conflict between government and opposition led to the 
outbreak of armed hostilities in 1 948. 
Both Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell trace the origins of the deep rift 
between the opposition and the governments of Calderon Guardia and 
Picado to the early years of the Calderon presidency. In a series of events 
that remain unclear and understudied, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell suggest 
that Calderon Guardia's declaration of war on Germany, Italy and Japan 
during the last weeks of 1 94 1  alienated key members of Costa Rica's 
dominant class, many of whom were purportedly German and Italian 
immigrants or their descendants and/or sympathisers of the Axis powers. 
These individuals, along with the former president between 1 936 and 
1 940, Leon Cortes Castro, and his followers began to organise a new 
political party, the Democratic Party (PD) in opposition to Calderon 
Guardia's government. Allegedly most of Costa Rica's wealthy, led by 
Cortes Castro, became entrenched opponents of the government once 
Calderon Guardia began a series of reforms that gave birth to the Costa 
Rican Social Security System ( 1 94 1 ), the country's first Labour Code 
( 1 943) and the amendments to the constitution, known as the Social 
Guarantees ( 1 943), among other programmes. The withdrawal of support 
by his former reluctant backer, Cortes Castro, and the reputed hostility of 
key sectors of Costa Rica's dominant class are seen as the reasons why 
Calderon Guardia formed an alliance with the Communist party, led by its 
congressman, Manuel Mora Valverde. This alliance also received the tacit 
support of Monseiior Victor Manuel Sanabria, Costa Rica's Roman 
Catholic Archbishop.ll 
11 The famed alliance between the Communist party and Calderon Guardia's government 
is discussed by Gerardo Contreras and Jose Manuel Cerdas, Los aiios cuarenta,' historia 
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Both accounts then describe the increasing polarisation between 
opposition and government in Costa Rica. The opposition's charges of 
fiscal corruption and nepotism against what they began to refer to as 
, Caidero-comunismo' soon attracted the support of Gtilio Ulate Blanco, 
publisher of a leading daily, the Diario de Costa Rica, and a former 
congressman. 12 The ranks of the opposition also were joined by the group 
of young intellectuals of the Centre for the Study of National Problems 
(CEPN), who in 1 945 combined forces with the small political party, 
Democratic Action (AD), to form the Social Democratic Party (PSD)Y 
Upon returning in 1 944 from the exile imposed on him by Calderon 
Guardia in 1 942, Jose Figueres began to participate in the affairs of both 
parties, when not attempting to organise an armed insurrection against 
Caideronismo.14 
By 1 945, violence and other forms of protest became widespread once 
elements within the opposition began to believe that the government 
would never permit official candidates to lose elections. In 1 942, the first 
occasion in which the opposition attempted to participate in electoral 
politics, its efforts were stymied by officially sponsored or permitted 
electoral fraud (a resource frequently employed by Costa Rican 
governments to influence electoral results). The use of such fraud was 
repeated in the 1 944 presidential and legislative elections that were marred 
by irregularities that, in the opposition's view, were of sufficient extent to 
suggest that fraud had prevented Cortes Castro from rightfully becoming 
Costa Rica's next president. Unfortunately, neither author attempts to 
organise systematically the many and varied reports of fraud existing in 
de una politica de alianzas (San Jose, 1 9 8 8). For additional discussions of Sanabria' s  role 
in the promulgation of these "and related reforms, see Santiago Arrieta, EI pensamiento 
socio-politico de Monseiior Sanabria (San Jose, 1 9 7 7), Ricardo Blanco Segura, Monseiior 
Sanabria (San J ose, 1 9 7 1) and Gustavo Adolfo Soto Valverde, La iglesia costarricense y 
la cuestion social: antecedentes, andlisis y proyecciones de la reforma social Costarricense de 
1940-4} (San Jose, 1 9 85) . Soto Valverde's book is particularly useful because it 
challenges the received opinion that Calderon Guardia needed to befriend the 
communists in order to avoid being overthrown by groups of angry capital ists. See 
especially pp. 1 89-347. This i ssue will be discussed in the next section of this article. 
12 Despite his obvious importance in Costa Rican politics, Ulate Blanco has only received 
the attention of one biographer. See Jose Luis Torres, Otilio Ulate: su partido y sus luchas 
(San J ose, 1 986) .  
13 See Jorge Enrique Romero Perez, Accion Democrata : los origenes del Partido Liberacion 
Nacional (de Leon Cortis a Jose Figueres) (San Jose, 1 9 83) and La social democracia en Costa 
Rica (San J ose, 1 9 8 2). 
14 Biographies of Jose Figueres include: Charles D. Ameringer, Don Pepe : A Political 
Biograp1!J of Jose Figueres of Costa Rica (Albuquerque, 1 97 8) and Arturo Castro Esquivel, 
Jose Figueres Ferrer: el hombrey su obra (San J ose, 1 955) . 
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Costa Rican newspapers, or to examine other primary source material, to 
ascertain the veracity of opposition claims so that, at the very least, a more 
complete account of the nature, magnitude and distribution of electoral 
fraud could be established. 
For these authors, the opposition's lack of faith in the government's 
willingness to hold fair elections became a key issue during the huelga de 
brazos caMos of late July 1 947. This strike succeeded in paralysing a portion 
of the nation's commerce, and only came to an end when President Pica do 
signed a public agreement emphasising his commitment to holding non­
fraudulent elections in 1 948. Bell, in particular, also discusses the 
opposition's well-organised publicity campaign aimed at discrediting the 
government by repeating charges of fiscal and electoral corruption and by 
playing on the anti-communism of Costa Rican society and the US 
Embassy (ever more receptive to such efforts with the onset of the cold 
war). 15 Finally, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell spend some time outlining 
government attempts to reorganise the electoral registry and to revamp 
electoral practices as required by the recently enacted 1 946 Electoral Code, 
despite the increasingly apparent lack of time to do so. 
Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell devote many pages to describing the most 
salient events leading to the start of the civil war, once preliminary 
electoral results revealed that the opposition candidate, Ulate Blanco 
(54,931  votes), had defeated the government's favourite, Calderon 
Guardia (44,438 votes) . They show how efforts by the National Electoral 
Tribunal (TNE) to tally the vote, and to issue a provisional verdict on the 
elections by 25 February, were hampered by the partial destruction of 
already deficient and incomplete electoral material in a mysterious fire. 
Both authors also point out that when Calderonistas, believing that large 
numbers of their voters were prevented from casting ballots, presented 
the TNE with a petition requesting that these elections be nullified, their 
claims were ridiculed by the opposition and met with indifference by the 
presiding members of the TNE. In the eyes of both Aguilar Bulgarelli and 
Bell, these events only confirmed the belief of each side in the 
untrustworthiness of the other, thus polarising the Costa Rican party 
system. 
Consequently neither Aguilar Bulgarelli nor Bell expresses surprise 
that on 1 March (the constitutionally designated date requiring Congress 
to issue the final verdict on the presidential race in an election year) the 
Calderonista-dominated Congress nullified the election. Despite efforts by 
Monsefior Sanabria and others to mediate a solution between the 
government and opposition, the civil war is said to have begun on 1 2  
15 See Schifter, Las alianzas conflictivas, for the most detailed discussion available of this 
issue. 
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March when news reached San Jose that Figueres' makeshift army had 
exchanged gunfire with government troops. Both books also provide 
accounts of how Figueres had organised an army to lead such an 
insurrection, outline the course taken by the war and, finally, describe how 
key members of Costa Rica's diplomatic corps helped negotiate a ceasefire 
ending the war on 1 9  April. Both Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell end their 
volumes by discussing Figueres' triumphant march into San Jose, 
Picado's transference of power to the third presidential designate, Santos 
Leon Herrera, and, on 8 May, Figueres' consolidation of political power 
as leader of the de facto Junta Fundadora de la Segunda Republica. 
Despite their unstated premise that the 1 948 civil war stemmed from a 
multiplicity of causes, neither author spends much time discussing, for 
example, the effects of the war-induced increase in the daily cost of living 
or the economic consequences of the social reforms. Neither Aguilar 
Bulgarelli nor Bell discusses, in any detail, the fiscal and foreign exchange 
crisis clearly in evidence by the end of Calderon Guardia's presidency. Yet 
both authors do assume that Calderon Guardia and Picado's reformist 
policies did alienate key sectors of Costa Rica's dominant class. They 
simply do not attempt to discover how these phenomena affected different 
social groups and whether these groups entered the electoral arena or 
otherwise sought to influence the nature of state policy. 
Class and economic perspectives 
It is the desire to discern links between economic developments and overt 
political conflict that inspired Jacobo Schifter's La fase oculta de la guerra 
civil, and also Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-1948 by Manuel 
Rojas Bolanos. Indeed, both Rojas Bolanos and Schifter essentially argue 
that less than favourable economic conditions and/or contradictory class 
forces inevitably led to the outbreak of armed conflict in 1 948. In the 
course of developing this theme these two authors furnish data not 
previously well known, which they interpret by means of theoretical 
speculation. 
Schifter's principal empirical contribution to the study of class 
alignments during the 1 940S is an ecological analysis of electoral returns 
during the 1 950S and 1 960s, which was originally produced by the North 
American political scientist, Robert Trudeau.16 Schifter's primary goal is 
16 See chapter four of La fasa oculta de la guerra civil (San Jose, 1 979). For Trudeau's 
analysis, see his ' Costa Rican Voting: Its Socioeconomic Correlates', unpub! .  PhD 
diss . ,  Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hil l ,  1 97 1 .  
As Schifter himself points out, this data should be analysed with a great deal of care . 
It should not be forgotten that this analysis hinges on electoral results from the decades 
following the civil war to interpret class alignments during the 1 940S . Furthermore, as 
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to contend that it was the Calderonista PRN along with its successors, and 
not either the PSD or its progeny, the National Liberation Party (PLN), 
that received the support of the urban working class and popular sectors 
as well as that of the workers on the banana estates owned by the United 
Fruit Company. Regrettably, Schifter does not speculate on the
. 
social 
bases of the opposition to Calderonismo. 
He also makes what I think is a cogent argument, in chapter II, that the 
closing of the historically very important German market for Costa Rican 
coffee exports during World War II did not adversely affect either the 
economy or the interests of coffee growers. As Schifter points out, it was 
only between 1 939 and 1 940 that the value of coffee exports declined. 
While total agricultural exports decreased between 1 937 and 1 94 I, the 
value of coffee exports increased after 1 940, because the US replaced 
Germany as the principal consumer of Costa Rican coffee. Schifter also 
contends that it remains unclear how the dominant class reacted to 
Calderon Guardia's jailing, or to the expulsion of members of Costa Rica's 
German community to US internment camps. 
In his Lucha socialy guerra civil en Costa Rica, Rojas Bolanos contends that 
the promulgation of social reforms between 1 94 1  and 1 943 drove a wedge 
between Calderon Guardia's (and later Picado's) government and the 
Costa Rican oligarchyY Alongside alleged capitalist dissatisfaction with 
the Calderon Guardia government, Rojas Bolanos argues that it also 
began to feel the effects of former president Cortes Castro's increasingly 
popular campaign for re-election in 1 944. He points out, for example, that 
the cost of living essentially doubled between 1 94 1  and 1 944, most 
severely affecting the poorest social sectors. IS On the basis of this and 
related evidence, Rojas Bolanos concludes that ' the peasantry was more 
inclined to follow Leon Cortes, whom it remembered as the strong man 
who had piloted an ordered public administration '. The peasantry, 
because of inflation and the war-induced scarcity of basic consumer goods, 
ecological analysis does not require the use of individual-level data, the correlations 
produced by Trudeau only measure the nature of the relationship between the overall 
social characteristics of , and the aggregate number of votes received by each party in, 
targeted cantons. The precise nature of class alignments within each canton remains 
unknown. 
17 Rojas Bolanos, Lucha socialy guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-1943 (San J ose, 1 979) ,  p. 1 2 . 
Also, see p. 45 for a slightly more extensive affirmation of the core idea of Rojas 
Bolanos' study. 
18 The cost of living index rose from 109 . 13 in July 1 94 1  to 1 89 . 2 9  points by December 
1 944 ( 1 936 = 1 00) . Rojas Bolanos took his data, in Lucha socialy guerra civil en Costa 
Rica, 1940-1943, p. 8 I, from Rodrigo Facio, La moneda y la banca central en Costa Rica 
(Mexico, D. F . ,  1 947) ,  p. 1 8  I. Note: the edition of Facio's book cited by Rojas Bolanos 
is  identical, except for its pagination, to the version I subsequently footnote. 
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viewed the Calderon Guardia government with distaste, especially since 
' administrative disorder and governmental corruption were so evident, 
and the benefits of the social reforms were not reaching the masses, above 
all the impoverished peasantry '.19 Unfortunately, this provocative 
interpretation is not complemented with an analysis of how urban 
workers, artisans and others were affected by the increase in the cost of 
living, or whether and how they mobilised to promote their interests. 
The shortcomings of Rojas Bolanos' analysis of the political behaviour 
of the lower classes point to the difficulties associated with the view that 
class conflict caused the 1 948 civil war. Contending that class struggle 
explains the outbreak of armed hostilities in 1 948 requires the analyst to 
show why and how disputes over the distribution of material resources 
generated the principal political cleavages of Costa Rican society. 
That class struggle was the motor of Costa Rican political history 
during the 1 940S is confirmed according to Rojas Bolanos, by the alleged 
existence of a rift between Calderon Guardia's government and the Costa 
Rican oligarchy. According to his view of the social world, states typically 
protect the interests of the dominant class, thus preserving the capitalist 
mode of production. 20 That state officials and capitalists disagree, 
however, might suggest the limitations of such a functionalist theory of 
the state, rather than establishing the centrality of class conflict in Costa 
Rica in the 1 940s. It is confused thinking to assume that the consequences 
- in this case, public policies beneficial for the capitalist system - of any 
set of institutions such as the state can straightforwardly explain its 
existence. Doing so requires the use of functionalist instead of causal 
analysis and either denies, or cannot coherently account for, the role 
played by intentional subjects in human affairs.21 
A class-centred interpretation of the 1 940S would also have to show 
that the interests of Costa Rican classes and class fractions were affected 
in divergent and adverse ways by economic changes and/or state policy. 
Finally, the class analyst would need to explain how and why these classes 
19 Rojas Bolanos, Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-1943. The first quotation 
appears on the last paragraph of p .  9 1, the second near the bottom of p .  8 9' 
20 See ibid. pp. 3 2-3 and p .  39. 
21 See his ' Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological 
Individualism' ,  Theory and Society, vol . II, no . 4 (July 1 9 8 2) and his Making Sense of 
Marx (New York and London, 1 9 8 6) .  It remains unclear whether Marxist theories can 
comprehend state behaviour. Theda Skocpol concludes that three important types of 
neo-Marxist theories of the state are fundamentally flawed because they cannot 
adequately comprehend the behaviour of the state in the United States during what 
Rojas Bolanos would label a ' periodo de cris is' .  See her ' Political Response to 
Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal', 
Politics and Society, vol. 1 0, no. 2 ( 1 980) .  Also, see Axel Van den Berg, Immanent Utopia,' 
From Marxism on the State to the State of Marxism (Princeton, 1 9 8 8) .  
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and class fractions became organised as collective actors when (and if) 
their interests were threatened. 
Available evidence indicates (as Rojas Bolanos, to his credit, admits) 
that the interests of the dominant class during Calderon Guardia's 
presidency were both threatened and safeguarded. 22 
The creation of the Social Security Institute and certain provisions in 
the Labour Code requiring employers to make compensation when 
dismissing employees undoubtedly angered industrialists, merchants, and 
agriculturists. How did capitalists actually respond to Calderon Guardia's 
reformist policies? Relying upon the oft-quoted opinions of Mora 
Valverde, the longtime leader of the Costa Rican Communist Party, Rojas 
Bolanos contends that, by 1 942, Calderon Guardia's social reforms had 
alienated many of the country's capitalists. Manuel Mora Valverde testifies 
that sometime during the first months of 1 942 he was invited by Mariano 
Cortes (a PRN deputy since 1 936) to attend a meeting in the home of 
Jorge Hine (the General Manager of the Bank of Costa Rica), where a 
group of capitalists were allegedly organising a coup to overthrow 
Calderon Guardia's government.23 The argument is that, confronted by 
such opposition, Calderon Guardia decided to form an alliance with the 
Costa Rican Communist Party as a way of increasing his social base of 
support.24 Capitalist dissatisfaction with Calderon Guardia's drift to the 
Left also is revealed, according to Rojas Bolanos, by the fact that key 
members of Costa Rica's dominant class, like Jorge Hine, Frederico 
Rohrmoser, Marco A. Gonzalez L., Carlos Gutierrez and Roberto 
Salazar M. had endorsed Cortes' presidential candidacy by 1 943.25 
Many other capitalists, however, did not feel that the alleged danger 
posed by Calderon Guardia's reforms warranted their backing Cortes 
Castro's bid for the presidency. Indeed, one member of the Executive 
Committee of the PD, Congressman Luis Calvo Gomez, argued that 
Cortes Castro lost the 1 944 election in part because he never attracted the 
22 Rojas Bolanos, Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-48, p. 8 1 .  
23 Rojas Bolanos, ibid. p .  8 1 . The source of this claim i s  the interview, ' Fundacion del 
Partido Vanguardia Popular ', Entrevista no. I hecha por Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli al 
senor Manuel Mora Valverde, in Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, Costa Rica y los hechos politicos 
de 1948, anexo I, pp. 489-9 1 .  There is a discussion of this famous incident on pp. 5 5 -7 
of Aguilar Bulgarelli 's book .  No one is sure exactly when this meeting took place. 
Rojas Bolanos, Lucha socialy guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-48, p. 97, n .  I, also suggests 
it took place during the first part of 1 942. But Sota Valverde, La Iglesia Costarricense 
y la cuestion social, pp. 2 8 9-97, provides convincing evidence that Mora Valverde's views 
are factually incorrect and, by implication, that the dominant class did not unite against 
Calderon Guardia's government because of its alleged dislike of these social reforms. 
This and the next paragraph rely heavily upon Sota Valverde's arguments. 
24 Rojas Bolanos, Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-48, p.  8 I. 
25 Rojas Bolanos, ibid., p. 9 2  refers to an article in Diario de Costa Rica ( 26  March 1 943) that 
makes this information public knowledge. 
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support of the Costa Rican dominant class.26 On at least one occasion (in 
August 1 943) other members of Costa Rica's dominant class, including 
Jose Joaquin Alfaro, Tomas Malavassi, Mariano Cortes, Fausto Co to 
Monge, and Walter Dittel, signed a public letter in support of the recently 
enacted Labour Code.27 That Congressman Mariano Cortes signed this 
declaration after he reputedly was plotting a coup against Calderon 
Guardia's administration suggests that proponents of the received wisdom 
have not bothered to construct an empirically consistent interpretation of 
Costa Rican history. 
Capitalist approval of or indifference towards the government no doubt 
stemmed from the fact that dominant class interests were affected in 
divergent ways by state policy. Coffee growers and exporters must have 
been pleased when Calderon Guardia's government announced in 1 940 
that it would guarantee a minimum price for coffee exports, as well as 
eliminating taxes on such exports.28 Not surprisingly, then, during the 
1 940S conflicts in the coffee sector continued their post- 1 9 30 decline in 
importance and number. 29 The government also must have made 
additional friends among Costa Rica's wealthy when it passed a law in 
1 940 aimed at protecting new industrialists from foreign competition.30 
After 1 944 Picado's government shied away from submitting a 
monetary law to Congress once Manuel Francisco Jimenez Ortiz, a key 
spokesman of Costa Rican liberalism, had launched a campaign against the 
proposed bill. 31 Picado did, however, provoke the ire of most 
entrepreneurial associations at the end of 1 946, when his government 
gained legislative approval for new income and property taxes.32 
26 See his ' Don Leon Cortes murio lamentandose de la indiferencia de los capitalistas ', 
Diario de Costa Rica (San J ose), no. 8 ,3 2 5  ( 2 2  Dec. 1 946), pp . I, 5 .  
27 The letter mentioned in the previous sentence is dated 5 August 1 943 and is printed 
in Soto Valverde, La iglesia Costarricense y la cuestion social, pp. 337-8 . 
28 See Rodrigo Facio, La moneday la banca central en Costa Rica (San Jose, 1 9 73), pp. 1 5 2-6 
for an analysis of these measures .  
29 V fetor Hugo Acuna Ortega, 'Patrones del  conflicto social en la economia cafetalera 
costarricense ( 1 900- 1 948) ', Revista de Ciencias Sociales (San Jose, Costa Rica), no. 3 1  
(March 1 9 86) . 
30 See 'Ley No. 36 (2 1 December 1 940) ', Coleccion de leyesy decretos (San Jose, 1 940), pp. 
739-42 .  This law was subsequently reformed. See 'Ley No. 641  ( 1 4  Aug. 1 946) ', 
Coleccion de leyes y decretos (San Jose, 1 946) .  
31 This occurred during the autumn of 1 94 5 .  See Facio, L a  moneday la banca central e n  Costa 
Rica, pp. 2 8 5 -9 5  for a brief description of the government's abandonment of its 
proposed monetary laws .  
32 An account of this  campaign from one of its proponents can be found in Manuel F .  
Jimenez, Intervenciones Ptiblicas (San Jose, 1 9 5  I), pp . 13-43 . The government's position 
on its financial policies is defended by the Minister of Finance, Alvaro Bonilla Lara, La 
aplicacion de las leyes de ordenamiento fiscal (San Jose, 1 947) and by President Picado in his 
Impuesto sobre la renta (San Jose, 1 947) . These three originally published their views in 
the pages of Diario de Costa Rica and La tribuna during the first two months of 1 947. 
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Merchants also began to criticise government economic policy when the 
Picado administration could not easily solve the severe foreign exchange 
crisis produced by the resumption of imports from industrialised countries 
at the end of World War n.33 
However, the collective behaviour of capitalists (or any other class), 
cannot be inferred solely from an analysis of their class interests.34 It is still 
necessary to show how and why individual capitalists should have 
orchestrated a campaign to seek remedy from economic policies harmful 
to the capitalist class as a whole. Delineating how capitalists, in pursuit of 
their common class interests, dealt with the possibility of reprisals and the 
uncertainty regarding the behaviour of their colleagues, allies and 
opponents is thus an essential component of political analysis. 
An examination of the political consequences of the Picado admini­
stration's income and property taxes reveals that capitalists and middle­
class professionals reacted in divergent ways to a policy that slightly 
reduced their individual as well as common incomes.35 In the days after 
these taxes became law, staunch and long-term opponents of Calderonismo 
did persuade their middle-class colleagues in an assembly of professionals 
not only to abstain from paying the new taxes, but also to participate in 
a general strike.36 
The 300 of the estimated 1 ,500 members of Costa Rica's entrepreneurial 
associations who attended a hastily organised assembly could only agree 
to declare their willingness to consider not paying the recently enacted 
income and property taxes. Capitalists in attendance refused to heed the 
advice of hardline middle-class professionals, who were also attempting to 
get a motion approved calling for a tax boycott and a general strike. 
Fearing government sanctions, Alvaro Zuniga of the Costa Rican 
33 A useful overview of this problem is Rodrigo Facio, ' EI problema de las divisas ', Obras 
histrfricas, vol . I (San Jose,  1 97j) [this study was originally published in San Jose in 
1 9jo] . 
34 Perhaps the first systematic attempt to explain the divergence between individual and 
common interests is Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, 1 96j). 
For a path breaking explanation of capitalist behaviour in the light of these theories, see 
J ohn R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action,' Conflict and Cooperation in the Coal Industry 
(New York and London, 1 98 9)' Also, see Claus Offe and Helmut Wisenthal, ' Two 
Logics of Collective Action ', reprinted as chapter four in Claus Offe, Disorganised 
Capitalism (Cambridge, 1 9 8  j) for a discussion of the different types of collective action 
problems confronting capitalists and workers. 
35 Both taxes were progressive in nature. They are reprinted and discussed in ' Dictamen 
de la Comision de Hacienda del Congreso Constitutional ' ,  La gaceta,' diario oftcial, no. 
2 8 1  ( 1 0  Dec. 1 946), pp. 2 , 2°9- 1 2 .  
36 ' Ir a l a  huelga de brazos caidos s e  propuso anoche en l a  reunion de profesionales ' , 
Diario de Costa Rica, no. 8 , 1 23 (20 Dec. 1 948), pp. I, 8 .  The hardliners included Lie .  
Ramon Arroyo Blanco, Dr Luis DobIes Segreda, Dr Antonio Pena Chaverria, Dr 
Carlos Luis Valverde Vega and congressman Fernando Volio Sancho. 
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Chamber of Commerce spoke for many when he argued that no illegal 
measures should be adopted by the poorly attended assembly. An 
indication that Zuniga's opinions were widely held was the inability of 
assembly organisers to obtain the signatures of those present for a petition 
containing the motion passed. The decision in favour of moderation was 
confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce in its first general assembly of 
1 947, when it publicly declared that it would not adopt illegal or violent 
tactics in its efforts to have the new tax laws repealed.37 Their alleged 
dislike of Picado's presidential administration did not deter bankers from 
floating a loan to his government at the end of 1 947 nor prevent them 
from acting as intermediaries in search of a peaceful compromise between 
the government and opposition in the months preceding the start of the 
civil war.38 
It is clear that the interests of the dominant class were adversely affected 
as well as favoured by state policy during the 1 940S. That an unknown 
number of capitalists often criticised the government is also undeniable. 
What remains unproven and indeed improbable is the claim that capitalists 
organised a collective movement dedicated to overthrowing a regime 
allegedly inimical to their interests. 
Rojas Bolanos, however, remains unwilling to allow such facts to 
modify his view that the civil war was the product of class conflict. He 
settles for asserting that the class interests of all social groups found 
expression in different political parties during the 1 940S. For example, 
Rojas Bolanos claims that Cortes Castro and the PD were supported by 
' the large agroexport bourgeoisie - coffee growers and bankers - as well 
as a large portion of the large import merchants '. Similarly, he suggests 
that ' medium-sized businessmen and professionals of some renown, of 
progressive tendencies, began to surround Otilio Ulate '. I assume that 
Rojas Bolanos believes this group was joined by the sectors supporting 
Cortes Castro once he died in the aftermath of the 1 946 congressional 
elections. According to Rojas Bolanos, the CEPN and the AD, as well as 
its successor, the PSD, represented ' a  serious alternative to official 
reformism, started by circles of intellectuals of petty bourgeois extraction, 
fundamentally, and medium-sized businessmen in coffee or other, different 
productive branches of this industry '. Finally, in what is surely Rojas 
37 ' No pago de impuestos acord6 la asamblea de anoche ', Diario de Costa Rica, no. 8,3 24 
(2 1 Dec. 1 946), pp. I ,  8; ' En numerosa asamblea convocada por las  Cimaras 
representivas se acord6 la abstenci6n total del pago de impuestos ', La prensa libre, no. 
13,99 5  (2 I Dec. 1 946), pp. 1, 6; ' Movimiento de resistencia para el pago de impuestos ', 
La tribuna, no. 7, 8 5 5  (2 1 Dec. 1 946), pp. I, 3; ' Solemnemente declara la Camara de 
Comercio que no usara metodos ilegales 0 violentos contra las nuevas leyes tributarias ', 
La tribuna, no. 7 , 867  ( 1 0  Jan. 1 947), pp. I, 2 .  
38 'Resoluci6n No. 1 6  ( 1 9  Dec. 1 947) ', Cartera de  Hacienda y Comercio, ColeeeirJn de leyes 
y deeretos (San Jose, 1 947), pp. 34 1-2. 
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Bolanos' most innovative interpretation, he concludes that Calderonismo 
' formed a fraction of the national bourgeoisie, differentiated from the rest 
of this social class not by the productive branch where it invested its 
capital . . . but by its modernising ideas ' (italics in the original). 39 
Aside from artful theoretical embellishments, Rojas Bolanos fails to 
supply any evidence that supposed class interests found their political 
expression in the way he outlines. Unfortunately, this is a practice 
mimicked by other Marxist-influenced historians and sociologists who 
analyse the 1 940s. In Los anos cuarenta, Gerardo Contreras and Jose Manuel 
Cerdas also conceptualise political parties and other political vehicles as 
projections of often poorly defined class interests. 4o In their respective and 
widely read books, Jorge Rovira Mas and Jorge Mario Salazar Mora also 
contend that the behaviour of political actors was determined by class 
interests.41 While not nearly as explicit (nor as extreme) as Rojas Bolanos, 
Schifter too adopts such a perspective in La fase oculta de la guerra civil. 
While it may be true that political parties did attract supporters from 
these social classes, it is not clear whether party conflicts represented the 
clash of clearly identifiable class interests. For example, the CEPN, the AD 
and the PSD might be petty bourgeois in origins, but this is such a 
heterogeneous class that elements of it could easily be motivated by non­
class interests and/or by diverse economic interests or grievances to 
support a variety of different political parties. The clumsiness of Rojas 
Bolanos' theoretical premises is best revealed by the inconsistency of 
asserting that all political parties represented groups possessing con­
tradictory positions in the mode of production, except Calderonismo. 
Unfortunately, the anomaly of locating Calderonismo's interests in the 
realm of ideas is never satisfactorily addressed by Rojas Bolanos. 
Ironically, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell also adopt a variant of this 
portrait of social and political dynamics. Without succumbing to the 
worst aspects of a class reductionist perspective, both Aguilar Bulgarelli 
39 With the exception of the last quotation, all other citations can be found in Rojas 
Bolanos, Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-48, p. 1 03. The quotation about 
Calderonismo as a class f raction i s  on p .  48. 
40 Los anos cuarenta, pp. 8-9, 72- 8 2 , 86 , 97, 1 0j,  and 1 20 for numerous examples of class 
reductionism. It is interesting to note that Contreras and Cerdas,  ibid. pp. 8-9, once 
refer to the work of Mario Ramirez Boza to substantiate their conceptualisation of 
Costa Rican class structure . Yet neither they nor Ramirez Boza supply evidence linking 
classes and class fractions to political organisations .  Indeed, Ramirez Boza does not 
seem to want to attempt to pursue this obj ective. That, at least, i s  my reading of 
Ramirez Boza's ' EI desarrollo de las c1ases sociales y la industria en Costa Rica 
( 1 8 80- 1 930) ' ,  unpub\. Master's Thesis, Master's Programme in Central American 
Sociology, University of Costa Rica, 1 983.  
41 See Jorge Rovira Mas, Estadoy politica economica en Costa Rica, 1948-l970, tercera edicion 
( San Jose, 1 9 8 8),  esp. pp. 3� 1 1 8  and the' anexo teorico', where the class reductionism 
of his approach i s  discussed in painful detail ; and Jorge Mario Salazar Mora, Polilica 
y reforma en Costa Rica, 19IrI9J8 (San J ose, 1 9 8  I), esp. pp. 67-134 .  
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and Bell also visualise the 1 948 civil war as the inevitable clash of 
competing social sectors. Aguilar Bulgarelli, for example, tends to see the 
1 940S as the appearance of reformist presidents compelled to form an 
alliance with the Communist party because of the opposition of the 
oligarchy. From his perspective, the alliance between oligarchical interests 
and the CEPN and the PSD remains a mystery, as the latter two groups 
represented the aspirations of a frustrated social class whose class interests 
were not well served by such an alliance.42 Bell also employs a similar set 
of concepts, though he clearly identifies this frustrated social group as that 
of Costa Rica's emergent middle sectors.43 He also remains perplexed as 
to why this nation's middle class refused to form a coalition with 
Calderonismo and chose instead to work with Costa Rica's most 
conservative economic sectors. Other analysts do not even seem concerned 
by this puzzle. Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer, Claudia Quiros V. and Jorge 
Rovira Mas do not even furnish the appropriate sociological evidence 
when they assert that the outcome of the 1 948 civil war represented the 
triumph of the middle class, or what they prefer to see as Costa Rica's 
version of the conquering industrial bourgeoisie.44 
Until we question the widely held belief that the 1 948 civil war was 
caused by class conflict, troublesome evidence on the subject will continue 
to cause unnecessary perplexity. Analysts will ignore the fact that 
dominant class interests were both helped and harmed by state policy 
42 See: ' No nos explicamos como un grupo de jovenes intelectuales, de la calidad de un 
Rodrigo Facio, quienes accedieron a unirse con un solo bloque, con el sector 
conservador de la politica nacional, que vela en todo 10 que tenia color de reforma 
social, un aspecto negativo para la buena marcha del pais, para sus instituciones y para 
sus intereses particulares pues estaban convencidos de que debian seguirse pie a pie, los 
postulados del liberalismo economico del siglo XIX. ' See his Costa Rica y sus hechos 
politicos de 1948, p. 246.  On pp. 297- 8 ,  Aguilar Bulgarelli explicitly refers to the 
frustration of the middle class .  He does so by referring to the book by Juan Bosch 
entitled Una interpretacion de la historia costarricense (San Jose, 1 98 0; originally published 
in 1 963) . 
43 This is made very clear in chapter one of Bell's book. Indeed, the North American 
fascination with Jose Figueres stems precisely f rom the supposed middle-class character 
of Figueres' political movement. It should be remembered that when Bell travelled to 
Costa Rica during the late 1 960s to conduct the research for his book, North American 
policy-makers and academics expected the Latin American middle classes to become 
non-communist, democratic reformers of their poverty-stricken societies. A book that 
nicely summarises this position is John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: 
The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Palo Alto, 1 9 5 8) .  It is also never very clear to Bell 
why this group disliked Calderonismo, nor why Costa Rica's middle-class reformer 
achieved and maintained power in an undemocratic fashion. 
44 Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer, La ideologia social democrata en Costa Rica (San Jose, 1 9 8 4); 
Claudia Quiros V . ,  Los tribunales de probidady de sanciones inmediatas (San Jose,  1 9 8 9) ,  pp. 
23-34 [these tribunales were hastily arranged courts that tried members of Calderon 
Guardia and Picado's governments during Figueres'  rule]; Jorge Rovira Mas, Estado 
y politica economica en Costa Rica, 1948-1970. 
The 1948 Civil War in Costa Rica 53 
during the 1 940S. The behaviour of individuals and classes will continue 
to be inferred inadequately from their often poorly understood class 
interests. Within this framework political alliances during the 1 940S will 
always remain an unresolved paradox. Most importantly, it will not be 
possible to explain why the ballot box failed to select a presidential 
candidate in 1 948 acceptable to government and opposition, why 
numerous attempts to negotiate a peaceful transference of political power 
ultimately collapsed, and why those who triumphed on the battlefield 
gained control of the state. 
An alternative view oj the 1948 civil war 
Attempts to understand the origins of the 1 948 civil war might begin by 
visualising this conflict as a breakdown of electoral institutions. The 
inability of political actors to accept the results of the 1 948 presidential 
election was a sufficient - though perhaps not also a necessary - condition 
for the outbreak of armed hostilities in the weeks after this election was 
held. 
Framed in this way, it is important to ask why electoral mechanisms 
were questioned by political actors in the period preceding these elections 
and thoroughly discredited by the members of the PRN and the PVP once 
they were held.45 Interestingly enough, it was members of the governing 
political coalition who claimed that these electoral results were fraudulent, 
because thousands of PRN and hundreds of PVP voters were prevented 
from casting ballots. While fraud directed against the government was 
unheard of in Costa Rica, the use of fraud and other extra-constitutional 
devices by all political actors was not. 
Until the late nineteenth century, public officials in Costa Rica, as in 
almost all Latin American countries, were selected in military contests or 
in fraudulent, often hastily organised elections.46 By the turn of the 
century, access to state offices in Costa Rica began gradually to be 
determined by intensely competitive and regularly held (albeit frequently 
fraudulent) electoral contests that did not exclude the threat and/or use of 
violence. Indeed, between 1 8 8 9  and the 1 948 civil war (during the period 
45 Even a casual examination of newspapers during this  period reveals the centrality of 
electoral issues in Costa Rican politics. A Calderonista view of the electoral fraud 
purportedly exercised against the government can be found in Jose Albertazzi 
Avendano, La Tragedia de Costa Rica, pp. 5 9-7 3'  An evaluation of this  claim, along with 
the opposition's allegation of fraud, i s  contained in my ' The Origins of Democracy in 
Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective ' ,  PhD dis s . ,  Department of Political Science, 
Duke University, forthcoming. 
46 For analyses of this  period, see Cleto Gonzalez Viquez, EI sufragio en Costa Rica ante la 
historia y la legislacion (San Jose,  1 9 7 5 ) ; Rafael Obregon Loria, Conflictos militares y 
politicos en Costa Rica (San J ose, 1 9 5 1 ), pp. 1 -79 ; and Jorge Saenz Carbonell, EI despertar 
constitucional en Costa Rica (San Jose,  1 9 8 5 ). 
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I refer to as the Old Republic), at least four coup attempts and eleven 
revolts were launched against the central government. 47 
Not only did elements in the government and opposition employ 
and/ or threaten to use violence and fraud to improve their position in 
electoral jousts, but fractions in each political camp came to the conclusion 
that only the use of violence would allow them to maintain or capture 
political power. In late August 1 947, for example, certain - reputably 
Calderonista - elements within the military attempted to assassinate the 
Minister of Public Security, Rene Picado (President Picado's brother), to 
provoke an internal coup against a government that was granting too 
many concessions to the opposition. 48 Opposition figures like Jose 
Figueres were widely believed to favour the use of military resources to 
topple what they believed to be a government that would never willingly 
relinquish power to the opposition. 49 
Despite the existence of hardliners on both sides, numerous attempts 
were made by most political parties to effect what was often derisively 
called a transaccion, that is, the selection of a presidential candidate 
acceptable to both government and opposition. Cortes Castro attempted 
to negotiate such a compromise with Picado, especially in the aftermath 
of both the 1 944 and the 1 946 elections. In fact, he made it publicly clear 
on at least one occasion that the use of military force to overthrow 
Calderonismo was not a viable option and thus justified efforts to make a 
pact with the government. 50 Throughout 1 946, competing parties in the 
47 Obregon Loria, ibid. , pp. 80-1 1 6. For more general treatments of this period, see J orge 
Mario Salazar Mora, ' EI sistema politico-electoral Costarricense del periodo 
1 9 1 4-1 948 ' ;  Orlando Salazar Mora, Costa Rica: el apogeo de la republica liberal, I310-I9I4 
(San Jose,  1 990) and Mario Samper, ' Fuerzas sociopoliticas y procesos electorales en 
Costa Rica, 1 9 2 1 -1 9 3 8 ' ,  Revista de Historia (Heredia/San Jose,  Costa Rica) (mimero 
especial, 1 9 8 8) .  
48 See, for example, ' Fracaso un plan militar para asesinar al Secretario de Seguridad 
Publica ' ,  Diario de Costa Rica, no. 8 , 5 1 8  (26 Aug. 1 947) ; 'Cambiani de un momento a 
otro la situacion militar en el cuartel Bella Vista ' ,  Diario de Costa Rica, no. 8 , 5 1 7  ( 27  
Aug. 1 947). 
49 This was a charge frequently repeated in the pages of the pro-government newspaper, 
La Tribuna, especially during 1 947 and the first months of 1 948 .  Even a summary 
reading of the PSD's paper, Accion Democrata, between 1 944 and 1 947 reveals the 
adamant unwillingess of Figueres and others in the PSD to consider even compromising 
with the government. Figueres' own hardline position is  revealed in his ' Discurso 
pronunciado por Don Jose Figueres (des de Radio Monumental y Titania en la noche 
del 22 de Agosto de 1 946) ' ,  La prensa libre, no. 1 3 , 892  (24 Aug. 1 946), p.  4. 
so In the last interview Cortes granted to a journalist before his unexpected death on 3 
March he asked ' eEsta el pais en disposicion de ir a la resistencia armada ? Yo no podria 
lanzar a los partidarios que con tanta abnegacion me han seguido, a una asonada que 
seria una carniceria, porque no considero que este el pueblo armado en forma que su 
rebeldia tuviera vislumbres de buen exito . . .  Por eso he puesto oidos sordos a las 
insinuaciones de violencia, que solo podrian merecer el apoyo de los Costarricenses 
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opposition tried to negotiate a transaccion with the government that both 
the PD and PRN were pursuing but each denied was occurring. In the 
months before the 1 948 elections rumours abounded that different 
members of the government and opposition were conducting negotiations 
to avoid the armed confrontation that many feared might occur. 
From the day that elections were held, numerous attempts were made 
to mediate the conflict between members of the PRN and the opposition. 
Within a week of election day, a group of prominent Costa Ricans 
published an open letter asking Monseiior Sanabria to help them organise 
an effort to serve as mediators of the emerging political crisis. 5 1  Members 
of the TNE also attempted to effect a compromise, as they came to realise 
that they would be unable to examine all electoral materials by the 
constitutionally required 25 March deadline. Three days later, when the 
TNE, with two members in favour and one abstaining, provisionally 
declared the election of Ulate Blanco to the presidency, efforts intensified 
to devise a pact between Calderonistas and the opposition. After the 1 
March session of Congress that annulled the presidential election results, 
both Monseiior Sanabria and the Association of Bankers worked around 
the clock to reach a compromise. 52 But while various formulae were being 
discussed, word reached San Jose on 1 2  March that Jose Figueres had 
attacked government troops sent to discover whether rumours were true 
that an army was being assembled on his jinca. 
This brief survey of numerous attempts to reach a compromise makes 
the point that a peaceful resolution of the conflicts between the 
government and opposition was possible. Disagreements on the terms of 
the compromise of the conflict should not obscure the fact that key 
political actors were willing to sacrifice other goals for the cause of 
peaceful cooperation. Indeed, by late March, both Calderon Guardia and 
Ulate Blanco decided that the new Congress, in its first session on 1 May 
1 948, should select Dr Julio Cesar Ovares as first designate to the 
sensatos, cuando llevaran aparejada la preparacion adecuada, para que la protesta 
armada tuviera alguna probabilidad de buen exito y no significara simplemente un 
derramamiento infructuoso de sangre Costarricense. ' Cortes Castro then suggested that 
a compromise presidential candidate be found for the 1 948  elections. ' El ultimo 
reportaje  politico de don Leon Cortes ' [entrevista hecha por Sergio Carballo R . ] ,  La 
prensa fibre, no. 1 3 , 7 5 2 (6 March 1 946), pp. 1 , 3 .  
5 1  This open letter i s  dated 1 0  Feb. 1 94 8 .  I t  i s  signed by LUIS Davila, Jose Joaquin 
J imenez Nunez, LUIS Felipe Gonzalez Flores, Dr Antonio A. Facio, Jose Joaquin 
Alfaro Iglesias, Jorge Guardia, Edmundo Montealgre and J .  A. Gutierrez . See ' El 
poder ha de ser traspasado al ciudadano que haya obtenido la legitima mayoria electoral 
del domingo pasado ' ,  La prensa fibre, no. 1 4> 3  34 ( I I  Feb. 1 948), p .  2 .  
52 The only existing account to mention these negotiations is  Eugenio Rodriguez Vega, 
De Calderon a Figueres, pp. 1 79-8 7 .  
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presidency. Under this agreement, Dr Ovares would rule as interim 
president for a period of two years, during which new presidential 
elections would be held. But when this plan was presented to Figueres for 
approval, he did not accept its terms. Instead he continued to lead the 
army that would eventually prove triumphant in the civil war. 
The four books I have examined do not discuss these events in any real 
detail, thus implying that the course taken by events was inevitable. 
Schifter, for example, in the ten pages of chaper III in La Jase oculta de la 
guerra civil dedicated to exploring the period between 1 946 and 1 948,  does 
not even mention any of these efforts to reach a political compromise. Bell 
does mention some of these efforts in chapters five and six of his book. 
However, he concludes a bit too hastily that ' the actions of 1 March closed 
the way to any alternative other than insurrection '. 53 Such a conclusion 
can only be justified if Bell can show that both the government and 
opposition were unwilling to devise a pact to prevent the outbreak of 
armed hostilities feared by many. Yet he only hurriedly discusses this 
period, barely referring to Monsenor Sanabria's efforts and offering no 
analysis of those made by the Association of Bankers to effect a transaccion. 
Dr Ovares' transitional candidacy, in fact, is only mentioned in a footnote 
by Bell.54 
Similarly Rojas Bolanos only devotes a small number of pages to the 
analysis of government-opposition relations between 1 946 and 1 948.55 He 
also pays little attention to efforts to arrange a compromise between the 
Calderonistas and the opposition. Even Aguilar Bulgarelli chooses to 
examine only some of these endeavours, despite spending quite a few 
pages discussing this period. 56 For example, he only dedicates one page to 
Monsenor Sanabria's efforts in the wake of the nullification of the 
elections by Congress. Neither does Aguilar Bulgarelli make any mention 
of the Association of Bankers' participation in these and other attempts to 
reach a peaceful compromise. 
The selective coverage of political events apparent in these narratives is 
well illustrated by Aguilar Bulgarelli's extensive treatment of Calderon 
Guardia's motives for presenting the Constitutional Congress with a 
petition requesting that the 1 948 presidential elections be annulled. He 
contends that if Calderon Guardia had really thought the elections were 
fraudulent, he should have asked Congress to nullify not only the 
presidential, but also the congressional elections of 1 948.  Unfortunately, 
53 Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica, pp. 1 2 8-9 ' 
54 See ibid. , p. 1 3  j ,  n. 1 0. Bell ' s  minuscule effort to understand the role played by 
Monseiior Sanabria and the Association of Bankers is to be found on pp. 1 2 8-30 .  
5 5  See h i s  Lucha social y guerra civil en  Costa Rica, I94o-I948, pp .  1 3  I - j  j .  
56 See his Costa Ricay los hechos politicos de I948, pp. 1 46-294. The page reference made in 
the sentence following this footnote is  p. 294.  
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the plausibility of this argument is undermined by the simple fact that 
under the Constitution only the new Congress itself, in its first session on 
1 May, was empowered to determine the validity of the election of its new 
members. 57  
Conclusion : questioning the inevitability thesis 
The tendency not to explore key events and issues in the detail they 
deserve, along with a set of assumptions privileging the social and/or 
economic roots of political conflict, have led to the conclusion that the 
1 948 civil war was inevitable. In combination, these two practices have 
stifled academic and critical inquiry about the civil war. They also ­
perhaps unintentionally - serve to reinforce those interpretations of the 
civil war explicitly designed to glorify the role played by Figueres in the 
events of these years. This indeed is a paradoxical result, for Schifter's 
book is rather anti-Figuerista in tone, Aguilar Bulgarelli's book is often 
accused of being Calderonista in inspiration, and Rojas Bolanos' volume, 
at the very least, is not meant to praise the role played by Figueres during 
the 1 940s. 
Thus, standard explanations of the origins of the 1 948  civil war will 
remain flawed unless relations between class interests, economic change 
and political action are specified. Political narratives like those of Aguilar 
Bulgarelli and Bell do not stand up to scrutiny because they rest upon a 
questionable understanding of economic and class dynamics as well as a 
selective analysis of political phenomena. Economic and class perspectives 
fail to explain why the political conflicts of the 1 940S had to be settled 
through the force of arms because they employ a set of assumptions that 
conceive of the political arena as a mere projection of ' real ' and 
inadequately studied conflicts occurring among the material foundations 
of society. Both approaches lead to the theoretically dubious and 
empirically unsubstantiated conclusion that the outbreak of violence was 
inevitable during 1 948 in Costa Rica. 
57 Marco Tulio Zeledon, Lecciones de ciencia constitucional y la constitucion polifica de la republica 
de Costa Rica (San Jose,  1 94 ) , p .  1 20, article 9 1 .  The version of the Costa Rican 1 8 7 1  
constitution published in Zeledon's book i s  updated to include all reforms in effect for 
the elections of 1 94 8 .  Aguilar Bulgarelli discusses Calderon Guardia's petition in Costa 
Ricay sus hechos politicos de 1948, pp. 267-9 2 .  It is worth noting that Aguilar Bulgarelli 
(ibid. , pp. 2 7 7-8 ,  n .  2 3) also errs when he states that the documentary appendices of 
Calderon Guardia's petition cannot be found, thus preventing analysis of the former 
president's  charges of fraud. While it may be true that the originals are not in the 
archives either of the Legislative Assembly or of the Supreme Tribunal of Elections, 
they are available in published form. See La gaceta : diario oficial, no. )0 (29 Feb. 1 948), 
pp. 3 66-8 ; no. )6 (7  March 1 948), pp. 409-20.  An analysis of these and many other 
documents will be included in my ' The Origins of Democracy in Costa Rica in 
Comparative Perspective ' ,  forthcoming. 
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Contesting the belief that the 1 948 civil war was inevitable generates 
counterfactual speculation, an approach that is deemed less than useful by 
many. 58 However, the counterfactuals implied by my reinterpretation of 
the 1 940S focus on opportunities missed to negotiate a peaceful 
compromise to existing political conflicts. They do not serve as inspiration 
for the construction of hypothetical worlds of what would have happened 
if certain decisions had not been taken or if alternative choices had been 
made. Understanding why political actors did not select one or more 
possible courses of action contributes to explaining why they made the 
decisions that they actually did. Reconstructing the calculations made by 
political actors to assess the efficacy of alternative courses of action is 
perhaps the best way to comprehend how the behaviour of each political 
actor was constrained by the behaviour of all. 
Emphasising the role of political choice in preventing regime 
breakdown is, in fact, a central feature of important recent work on the 
collapse and reconstruction of democratic practices. 59 This approach 
contends that underlying class conflicts and/or severe economic crises do 
not compel political actors to undermine democratic practices. This article 
suggests that analysts of political change need to discern whether 
institutional arrangements encourage or discourage cooperation, and to 
explore the opportunities missed or ignored by political actors to resolve 
their conflicts peacefully. 
The 1 948 civil war occurred because political parties as well as members 
and institutions of the state could not reach mutually beneficial 
compromises regarding the most appropriate way to capture or retain 
state power. Such inability to mediate differences about political succession 
within existing institutional arrangements was by no means unusual in 
58 Victor Hugo Acuna warned me of the dangers of counterfactual reasoning. I hope that 
this paragraph explains that I am not advocating, on this occasion, the development of 
a '  new political hist.ory ' like the ' new economic history ' (though I might in the future) . 
On the uses of counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences see Jon Elster, Logic and 
Society : Contradictions and Possible Worlds (New York, 1 97 8); T. A Climo and P. G. A .  
Howells, ' Possible Worlds in Historical Explanation ' ,  History and Theory, 1 976 ; and 
Peter D. McClelland, Causal Explanation and Model-building in History, Economics and the 
New Economic History (Ithaca, 1 97 5 ) .  Though he uses very different language to make 
the argument I defend in this paragraph, Miguel Acuna also concurs in the use of 
counterfactuals to understand the 1 948  civil war. See his Calderonista-inspired E1 43, pp. 
1 5 - 1 8 , 44- 5 , 26 5 , 269, 3 7 5 -9 .  The book as a whole can be considered as an exploration 
of a large number of counterfactual propositions about the 1 948 civil war. 
59 See, for example, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes, four volumes (Baltimore, 1 97 8) .  A particularly good study of a democratic 
breakdown that also finds inevitabilist theories distasteful is Wanderley Guilherme dos 
Santos, ' The Calculus of Conflict : Impasse in Brazilian Politics and the Crisis of 1 964 ' ,  
unpub\. PhD diss . ,  Stanford University, 1 979 .  Also see Guillermo A.  O'Donnell, 
Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 
four volumes (Baltimore, 1 986) .  
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Costa Rica. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Costa 
Rican political actors began to rely on the ballot box to select the 
occupants of public office. Even when many agreed to compete for state 
power in the electoral arena, those in control of the executive often used 
fraud to modify electoral results. Violence was frequently threatened, less 
often used, but never disavowed as a legitimate political resource by 
hard line elements in the government, and especially by those in the 
opposition possessing the loyalty of few voters. 
Concentrating on the behaviour of electoral organisations and state 
officials to explain the outbreak of armed conflict in 1 948 does not imply 
that the behaviour of capitalists is of no political consequence. Indeed, 
understanding the role of the electoral arena in Costa Rican politics since 
the end of the nineteenth century requires discerning how public officials 
pursued policies that placated the interests of coffee exporters, import 
merchants and bankers. Several decades before the 1 948 civil war, for 
example, Costa Rican capitalists expressed their dislike of the financial and 
economic policies of President Alfredo Gonzalez Flores ( 1 9 1 4- 1 7) by 
supporting a coup organised by ambitious military officers and opposition 
political parties.60 
What my re-examination of Costa Rican politics during the 1 940S 
suggests is that the dominant class appears to have been reluctant to 
support coup attempts against the central government. The unwillingess 
of most capitalists to echo the calls of those in the opposition committed 
to overthrowing, by whatever means necessary, the governments of 
Calderon Guardia and Picado is understandable, because these govern­
ments often pursued policies favouring as well as harming their interests. 
It is also clear that many capitalists reasoned that armed resistance was not 
the most useful way to alter public policies they may have found 
distasteful. 
Focusing on the decisions made by political actors also helps to make 
the paradoxes about the patterns of alliance formation more apparent than 
real. That the PVP worked with a ' modernising fraction of the national 
bourgeoisie ', and that the ' middle sectors ' were in the opposition with 
' the most conservative sector of national politics ', is only counter­
intuitive from a perspective that mechanistically links poorly defined class 
interests to political organisations. All political parties devised strategies 
to capture state power precisely because different elements in the 
60 The standard secondary sources on the overthrow of this president are : Carlos LUIS 
Fallas Monge, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores (San J ose, 1 9 76) ; Eduardo Oconitrillo Garda, 
Alfredo Gonzalez Flores : estadista incomprendido (San Jose, 1 9 80) ;  Armando Rodriguez, 
Admi"istracion Gonzalez Flores (San J ose, 1 97 8); and Bernardo Villalobos Vega, Alfredo 
Gonzalez Flores : polificas de seguros y de banca, I9IO-I9I7 (San Jose, 1 9 8 1) .  
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government and opposition had interests that diverged as well as 
converged. They formed unexpected coalitions with each other because of 
the choices already made (or in the making) by other political parties. It 
was the rules in existence regulating access to state office, along with the 
distribution of political preferences among key groups, that produced the 
- at first sight - rather strange set of alliances that occurred during the 
1 940S in Costa Rica. 
